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A CIVIL RIGHTS ACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND A
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO BE FREE FROM
DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT

MARK DOROSINt

I. INTRODUCTION

for equality
judicial
interpretations have restricted the scope and breadth of civil rights
laws and the Equal Protection Clause. The intransigence of
institutional discrimination has severely limited the ability of
individuals, communities, and advocates from achieving the
promise of full racial equality.' The legal requirement that those
challenging discrimination must prove intentional racial animus
has not only become a nearly impassable bar-especially given the
social opprobrium attached to openly racist conduct-but also
necessarily establishes a limiting principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment serves only a remedial purpose. It does not
gains made in the struggle
Despite
under the
thesignificant
civil rights legislation of the 1960s,'

f Mark Dorosin is the Managing Attorney at the UNC Center for Civil Rights.
University of North Carolina,J.D.; University of North Carolina-Greensboro, M.A.; Duke
University, B.A. The author is especially grateful to his comrades Elizabeth Haddix, Senior
Staff Attorney at the Center, for her thoughtful advice, support, and review of this article;
and Brent Ducharme, Maria D. Lopez Delgado, and Corey Frost for their edits and
research.
1. James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement, 34
STETSON L. REv. 413, 414 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Reviving The Dream: Equality and the Democratic Promise in
the Post-Civil Rights Era, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 789, 794 (2014) ("Though formal
American apartheid has been overthrown, the full equality that advocates have hoped for
has not been achieved. The idea of equality itself has been continually limited and
opposed, even in the twenty-first century.").
3. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause."); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating
that disproportionate impact is not enough to prove "invidious racial discrimination that
is forbidden by the constitution").
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affirmatively guarantee a prospective societal benefit-specifically,
the full and equal inclusion and participation in society.' Our
courts will approve, and even then only on a limited basis,
remedies that target past overt discrimination.' Positive raceconscious actions on the part of a governmental decision-maker,
even those targeted at addressing the continuing disparate impact
of our legacy of legal racial subordination, will likely be struck
down under a strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring analysis.'
Our current equal protection jurisprudence fails to address
the reality of race discrimination in the twenty-first century. The
entrenchment of racial inequities caused by the disparate
discriminatory impacts of ostensibly facially-neutral policies and
practices of government officials. While these policy decisions are
often made with full knowledge and foreseeability of the adverse
consequences for communities of color, current constitutional
jurisprudence demands that unless those decisions are made
because of those impacts, and not merely in spite of them, they are
not actionable.' Meanwhile, the statutory provisions of the Civil
Rights Act and other anti-discrimination laws that recognize
discrimination claims under a disparate impact analysis are under
attack or have already been eliminated.'
The deliberate narrowing of the scope of civil rights law to
exclusively focus on intentional discrimination limits our collective
vision of equality to a universe circumscribed by nondiscrimination, individual rights, process, means, and retroactive
remedies. It is a "micro" perspective on civil rights. It is also very
much a tort-based approach-there is a bad actor, who has done a
bad thing that has caused an injury, the remedy for which can be
quantified and implemented.' The focus on intent is also largely

4. See U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789 (1966) (quoting U.S. v. Williams 341 U.S. 70,
72 (1950) ("We have no doubt of the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate
criminal sanction every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.")).
5. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301 (1978).
6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (2000).
7. Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
8. See Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: The Availability of DisparateImpact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1527, 1563
(1996) (noting that although Title VII and the ADEA are almost identical, some courts
have not extended discriminatory impact in ADEA context).
9. David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1674
(2007).
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premised on the idea that civil rights are exclusively personal and
individualized."o
Conversely, a theory of racial justice that focuses on
discriminatory impacts emphasizes integration, group fairness,
substance, ends, and prospective change." This is the "macro"
analysis facing social justice advocates in the modern era. It must
be noted, however, that even though this macro approach
emphasizes forward-looking, affirmative obligations to address
discrimination, it is nevertheless grounded in the country's
institutional history of both dejure and de facto racial oppression
and its continuing impacts.'
As the nation reflects on the fiftieth anniversaries of the
various civil rights legislation of the 1960s' and considers the
challenges that remain for fully addressing our history of racial
discrimination, segregation, and suppression, we must begin with
a very fundamental question: What is the harm that we are seeking
to address, and how effectively do our current civil rights laws
work towards achieving that goal?
Given our collective success in addressing some of the most
egregious intentional discrimination, as well as the intransigent,
and evolving nature of institutional racism, it is time for a new
Civil Rights Act that focuses on discriminatory impacts and effects.
In light of the Court's restrictive interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause," this new Civil Rights Act should look to
another portion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, which should be interpreted to provide the
basis for guaranteeing the inclusion of African Americans into the
full range of benefits of our community. While the United States
Supreme Court undercut the Privileges and Immunities Clause

10.
11.

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978).
See discussion infra pp. 139-42.
12. Jonathan Fishbach ct al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies to
Remedy Dejure Segregation after ParentsInvolved in Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 491, 494 (2008) (stating that many of the early discrimination cases, especially in the
school context, dealt with de jure segregation, whereas recently the bulk of discrimination
law is focused around de facto discrimination).
13. Patterson, supra note 1, at 414.
14.

See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND

MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 38 (N.Y.U. Press 1993) ("In Washington v. Davis
the Supreme Court held that the applicable principle for equal protection clause
purposes is the intent principle.").
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just five years after the amendment was ratified,' 5 the new
challenges we face in achieving racial justice demand its
revitalization and reaffirmation.
II.

SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT

"While the Union survived the Civil War, the
Constitution did not. In its place arose a new, more
promising basis for justice and equality, the 1 4 1h
Amendment, ensuring the protection of life, liberty
and property of all persons against deprivation
without due process and guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. . . . What is striking is the
role legal principles have played throughout
America's history in determining the condition of
Negroes, They were enslaved by law, emancipated
by law, disenfranchised and segregated by law. . . ."

-Justice Thurgood Marshall'"
The development of a new civil rights strategy must begin
with some appreciation of the history of civil rights legislation and
the judicial interpretations that helped implement or limit that
legislation. The first era of civil rights-which starkly illustrates the
direct interplay between the efforts to expand civil rights for
African Americans and the resistance with which those efforts
were met-begins even before the Civil War and emancipation."
The Dred Scott case, widely considered the most notorious decision
the Supreme Court ever reached, helped drive the course of the
struggle for civil rights through the end of the 1 9 th century.

15. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1873) ("[T]hat no State should
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States.... [T]hc effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by
subjecting them to the control of Congress in the exercise of powers heretofore
universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character. . . .").
16. J. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco
Patent and Trademark Law Association, Maui Hawaii, 1987.
17. See generally WILLIAM CAIN, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
SLAvERY (1997) (stating that William Lloyd Garrison was a prominent abolitionist who
lived from 1805-1879 and was active at least thirty years before the Civil War).
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A. Dred Scott
The general parameters of the Dred Scott case are well
known. Scott, an African slave, travelled with his owner from
Missouri to Illinois and (what is now) Minnesota, a free state and a
federal territory where slavery was prohibited.'" Several years later,
after returning to Missouri, Scott sued for his freedom based on
the time he had spent in the areas where slavery was illegal.' 9
Following unsuccessful litigation in state court, 0 Scott
subsequently filed a case in federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction.'
Although the case could have been resolved on relatively
narrow grounds," by the time it got to the Supreme Court, it had
taken on much a national significance.23 The arguments presented
had broad implications for the balance of power between the free
and slave states and for the scope of the federal government's
power to regulate or control the expansion of slavery beyond the
South.24
These broader questions were grounded in the Comity
Clause of the Constitution, that states, "The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several states."2 ' The provision was necessary to effectively bind the
states together, and it quickly came to be accepted as requiring
that visiting citizens from other states be granted the same
privileges and immunities that a state provided to its own
citizens.2 ' The elimination of any discrimination against citizens of
other states was a relatively uncontroversial proposition,

18. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 394 (1857).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 396.
21. Id. at 400 (explaining that since the parties are citizens of different states, the
claim can be heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction). His owner's successor in
interest was a resident of New York, while Scott remained in Missouri. Id.
22. Id. at 159-60. The district court limited its holding to the ruling and rationale of
Missouri Supreme Court interpreting Missouri slavery laws; see also DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScorT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
the

276-80 (1978).
23. Id. at 160-61.
24. Id. at 160.
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 2.

26. See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 21 (2014) ("Following the Revolution, the

conferred rights of citizenship transferred to the newly independent states.").
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particularly when considered in the general context of balancing
state and federal powers.2 ' However, the starkly different
treatment of African Americans in free and slave states exposed a
fundamental inconsistency between the principles of national
comity and the elaborate legal infrastructure that propped up the
institution of racial slavery.28 In Dred Scott, the Court was forced to
directly confront the intersection of race and citizenship in
America and the reality that, under the broadly accepted
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a free
African American citizen of New York that traveled to North
Carolina would be constitutionally entitled to the same rights and
benefits as a free (read: white) man living in that state.
Chief Justice Roger Taney embraced the full sweep of the
issues before the Court. The question of Scott's citizenship, and
consequently the jurisdiction of the federal court, could have
simply focused on the underlying factual question of whether he
was free." If not, he could not be a citizen and therefore not be
before the court. 2 Instead, ignoring the historical fact that there
were free black citizens in several states at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution and living in free states since,
Taney begins his opinion with a racialized assessment that no
African American was ever intended to or could ever become a
citizen."
The legislation of the States therefore shows ...

the

inferior and subject condition of that race at the
time the Constitution was adopted, and long
afterwards ...

we are bound out of respect to State

sovereignties, to assume they had deemed it just
and necessary to stigmatize, and upon whom they
had impressed such deep and enduring marks of
inferiority and degradation.... It cannot be

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism'sForgotten Past, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw STORIES 162 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2nd ed. 2009).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Dred Scott V. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416 (1857).
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supposed that they intended to secure them rights,
and privileges . . in the new political body....
He then goes on to explain why the idea of African
Americans being citizens with the related privileges and
immunities of that status is inconceivable in a society based on
racial subordination.
For it they were so received, and entitled to the
privileges and immunities of citizens,

...

[ilt would

give to persons of the negro race, who were
recogni[z]ed as citizens in any one State ...

the

right to enter every other State whenever they
pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or
passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there
as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at
every hour of the day or night without molestation
...

and it would give them the full liberty of speech

in public and in private upon all subjects upon
which its own citizens might speak; to hold public
meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and
carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would
be done in the face of the subject race of the same
color, both free and slaves, and inevitably
producing discontent and in subordination among
them, and endangering the peace and safety of the
State.
Determined to reconcile the issues of race and citizenship,
and the privileges and immunities related to the latter, Taney's
opinion obliterates any distinction between free blacks and
slaves.3 ' Taney understood that Article IV would not permit
even if that
discrimination against inter-state citizens,
discrimination was based on race rather than outsider status.3 ' The
only way to accommodate the hierarchy of white supremacy upon
which the slave system depended was the Chief Justice's

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 416-17.
Id.
Id. at 41.
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conclusion that black people in America, whatever their status,
could not be citizens and in fact were never intended to be.`8
The question before us is whether the class of
persons

[African Americans] .

..

are constituent

members of this sovereignty? We think they are not,
and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word "citizens"
in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none
of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for citizens of the United States. On the
contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had
been subjugated by the dominant race, and whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
...

They had for more than a century . .

.

authority.

.

been regarded as beings on an inferior order, and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race . .
and so far inferior, that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect."

There was no need for the Court to consider the panoply
of privileges and immunities to which citizens were entitled;
whatever comprised that set of rights and benefits, African
Americans were entitled to none of them."
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Republicancontrolled Congress set out to overrule the Court's holding in
Dred Scott, to clarify and protect the rights on the newly freed
African Americans, and to prevent a return to the racial status quo

38. Id. at 416 ("[I]t is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not
intended to be included and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this
declaration.").
39. Id. at 405-06.
40. Id. at 405.
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ante.4 ' At the same time, these goals were tempered by entrenched
views about federalism and a restricted view of federal power,
particularly regarding areas of law traditionally controlled by the
states. Whereas the antebellum debate had focused on who was
entitled to share in the rights and benefits encompassed by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause," during Reconstruction the
focus would turn to defining what those rights and benefits
included."

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 ("CRA")-the first civil rights
legislation adopted in the United States"-both resolved the
citizenship exclusion of the Court's Dred Scott opinion and also
attempted to define and describe those fundamental rights
necessary to secure full inclusion (i.e., citizenship) in American
society.46 The constitutional authority for the CRA was the
Thirteenth Amendment," which outlawed not only the institution
of slavery, but also any racially discriminatory laws or actions that
could be considered "badges and indicia" of slavery.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That all persons born in the
United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every
race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ...

41. JOHN R. HOWARD, THE SHIFTING WIND 38 (SUNY PRESS 1999) ("[T]he decade
following the end of the Civil War witnessed a remarkable body of legislation being put
into place....").
42.

See Michael Kent Curtis, Reflections on Albion Tourgie's 1896 View of the Supreme

Court: A "Consistent Enemy Of Personal Liberty And Equal Right"?, 5 ELON L. REV. 19, 43
(2013).
43. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1837) (defining the rights that
constitute federal versus state privileges and immunities, while also defining limitations on
meaning of state action and rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
44.

See Reconstruction, America's FirstAttempt to Integrate, AFR. AM. REGISTRY, http://w

ww.aaregistry.org/historic-evcnts/view/reconstruction-americas-first-attempt-integrate

(last visited Dec. 10, 2015).
45.

See HOWARD, supra note 41, at 54.

46.

See The 1866 Civil Rights Act, RECONSTRUCTION THE SECOND CIVIL WAR (Dec. 19,

2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconstruction/activism/ps

1866.html.

47.

See DONALD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 44-46 (Praeger 1992).

48.

See The 1866 Civil Rights Act, supranote 46.
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shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personalproperty, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedingsfor the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding."
The CRA was not only motivated by a determination to
overrule Dred Scott, 0 but also to undercut the so-called "black
codes" that had been adopted by several southern states in the
wake of the war to severely limit the rights of the newly freed
slaves." The CRA, which was passed over an overtly racist veto by
President Andrew Johnson,"2 nonetheless faced some resistance
from more moderate Republicans in Congress, primarily over
federalism concerns and the scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment.5 3
In seeking to ensure that the former slaves were fully
included in benefits of membership in American society, the
decision to include a brief but specific list of what those benefits

49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. See HOWARD, supra note 41 at 53 (noting that the Act directly addressed
arguments used in Dred Scott, specifically citizenship of Black Americans).
51. Id. at 49-54.
52. Veto
of
the
Civil
Rights
Bill,
TEACHING
AM.
Hist.,
(last
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/veto-of-the-civil-rights-bill
visited Dec. 10, 2015).
The grave question presents itself whether ... it is sound policy to
make our entire colored population ... citizens of the United States.
Four millions of them have just emerged from slavery into freedom.
Can it be reasonably supposed that they possess the requisite
qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of
citizenship of the United States? ... [The bill establishes] for the
security of the colored race safeguards which go indefinitely beyond
any that the General Government has ever provided for the white

race. In fact, the distinction of race and color is by the bill made to
operate in favor of the colored against the white race.
Id.
53. See Darrell A. H. Miller, White Cartels, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Histoiy of
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999 (2008) (discussing that there were concerns
about state sovereignty and federalism).
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entail raises fundamental questions about how we define the
universe of "civil rights." That universe could-and ultimately, by
the Court would-be broken down into several subcategories with
the rights specifically identified in the CRA categorized as
"economic" and 'judicial" civil rights." Absent from the CRA
were rights impacting other subcategories, including political
rights (voting, running for office, etc.) or social rights (public
accommodations)." Whether one believes that the former
subcategories might eventually come to encompass the latter ones
or (given the growing resistance to equality for African
Americans) that subsequent legislation would be needed to secure
those additional categories of rights," it is clear that even the
arguably limited list contained in the CRA represented a
significant shift in the balance of state and federal power,
especially with regard to the protection of the rights of African
Americans.
The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, was in some
ways a constitutionalization of the CRA, and Section 1 of the
Amendment closely tracks the outline and structure of the CRA."
It begins with the citizenship provision" and then in broader
language sweeps all the specific rights listed in the CRA (and
potentially others) under the umbrella of "the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States."' The section
concludes with a restatement of the Due Process Clause from the

54. See HOWARD, supra note 41, at 53 (1999). An example of economic rights would
be the right to enforce contracts and hold property. Id. An example of judicial rights
would be the right to be secure in one's person and to not be subjected to peculiar race
based punishments. Id.
55. See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27-30 (1866)(codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 242 (2006) and 42 U.S.C §§ 1981-1982 (2000)); but see HOWARD, supra note 41, at
53 (1999) (stating which rights the Act specifically addresses).
56. Recognizing the primacy of the right to vote in securing and protecting the
rights of the freed slaves, and that the operations and oversight of elections were
otherwise quintessentially functions of state governments, the fifteenth Amendment
guaranteeing African Americans the right to vote was ratified in 1870. As to what might be
called "social rights," see discussion infra Section D.
57. HOWARD, supra note 41, at 53-54 ("The bill also identified specific rights, which
could not be denied or constrained for reasons of race. . . .").
58. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, with The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat.
27-30 (1866).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
60.

Id.
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Fifth Amendment and a guarantee of equal protection, both of
which mirror the CRA. 6 1
C. The Slaughter-House Cases (1873)
The first test of the constitutionality of the Fourteenth
Amendment came just five years after its adoption, and perhaps
most significantly, in a case that had nothing to do with the rights,
privileges, or equality of the newly freed Mrican Americans. 2 In
fact, the test case for the Amendment had nothing whatsoever to
do with race, which makes the Court's decision to severely narrow
its scope and eviscerate the spirit of racial equity that underlie the
Fourteenth Amendment so troubling."
In 1869, the Louisiana state legislature passed a law
creating and granting a monopoly to the Crescent City Livestock
Landing & Slaughter-House Company to slaughter animals in and
near the city of New Orleans." In exchange, the Crescent City
Company was required to comply with various state regulations
governing, among other things, the quality of facilities and
products, the output volume, and the price of livestock." The
company was also required to allow independent butchers to work
on its grounds at a set rate. Louisiana claimed the measure was
within its general police powers and promoted health and safety
by centralizing and improving slaughterhouse production." The
law also prohibited any other slaughterhouses from operating in
New Orleans." Butchers and slaughterhouse owners in the city
challenged the legislation, arguing that the creation of the
monopoly deprived them of the liberty to work in their chosen

61. Id. ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
62. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
63. Id. at 57-60.
64. Id. at 38-43.
65. Id. at 42.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1I1.
68.
d at 36.
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field in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 9
Justice Miller's opinion begins with a general analysis of the
breadth of police powers70 and likely could have stopped there
and upheld the statute without reaching the constitutional
question. At that point in history, however, the jurisprudential
doctrine of limiting rulings to the narrowest grounds when
possible had not been widely adopted,7 ' and so Justice Miller
seized the opportunity to announce the Court's interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Interestingly, he begins the analysis
with a precise statement that the cause of the Civil War was
slavery,73 and that the Thirteenth Amendment was clear and
limited in its purpose to end that nefarious institution.74 However,
Justice Miller acknowledges that the mere elimination of chattel
slavery, particularly in light of the southern "Black Codes" that
had been adopted in the wake of the Thirteenth Amendment, was
not sufficient to address the continuing suppression of African
Americans." The overt effort to effectively re-institute slavery
under another name
forced upon the statesmen who had conducted the
Federal government in safety through the crisis of
the rebellion, and who supposed that by the
thirteenth article of amendment, they had secured
the result of their labors, the conviction that
something more was necessary in the way of
constitutional protection to the unfortunate race
who had suffered so much.
Miller continues his historical summary of the
Reconstruction Amendments with a brief discussion of the

69. Id. at 57-58.
70. Id. at 62-65.
71. See, e.g., Dred Scottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
72. The Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 80.
73. Id. at 68 ("[W]hatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring about this
war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery.").
74. Id.
75. Id. at 70.
76. Id.
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Fifteenth Amendment," then states that the collective intent and
purpose of these amendments was indisputably
the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection
of the newly made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only
the Fifteenth Amendment, in terms, mentions the
negro by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it
is just as true that each of the other articles was
addressed to the grievances of that race, and
designed to remedy them as the fifteenth."
Despite this clear analysis, and in the face of a case that
contained no issue of race discrimination or "oppressions," Miller
immediately rejected the idea that these amendments apply only
to African Americans.7 1 In doing so he makes reference to the
possibility of discriminatory treatment of Mexicans or Chinese in
America,o but then begins to dissect the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment without any further explanation or
justification about why such analysis is appropriate given the
context he has just set forth and the fact that such context is
wholly absent from the case."1 In fact, the remaining portion of
the opinion reads as though none of the preceding passages
exist.82
Miller's review of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
begins appropriately with the assessment that it overrules Dred
Scott "by making all persons born within the United States and
subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its
main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can
admit of no doubt."8 ' Miller then goes on, however, to parse out a
distinction between being a citizen of the United States and a

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 73-83.
Id. at 73.

2016]

A CIVIL RIGHTS ACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

49

citizen of any particular state." He highlights the distinction in the
language of the first and second sections of the clause, stressing
that the former refers to both the nation and the states, while the
latter only refers to the nation ("No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States.").
Miller concludes that the clear
distinction between the explicit language of the two provisions
must mean that there are two distinct and separate types of
citizenship in America, each with an attendant set of rights and
benefits, and that the protections of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause apply only to one-those that derive from being a citizen of
the United States. 8 6
Having determined that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause only protects those rights associated with national
citizenship, Miller then goes on to explain that those rights
include: coming to the seat of government to assert any claim one
may have upon that government, free access to seaports,
protection of the Federal government when on the high seas or
within the jurisdiction of a foreign government, the writ of habeas
corpus, the right to use the navigable waters of the United States,
and all rights secured by treaties with foreign nations."
Absent from Justice Miller's universe of rights protected by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause are anything that could be
considered civil rights, including the specific rights enumerated in
the CRA, which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
constitutionalize." Including those rights within the protection of
the federal government would, Miller argued, undermine the
fundamental concept of federalism and "destroy the main features
of the general system."" Such an outcome could not have been
what the drafters intended, he concluded, but rather that "our
statesmen have still believed that the existence of the State with
powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation

84. Id. at 73-75.
85. Id. at 80 (comparing "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside," with "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States").
86. Id.
87. Id. at 79-80.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 82.
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of civil rights the rights of person and of property was essential to
the perfect working of our complex form of government. "9 0
D. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
The last piece of civil rights legislation of the nineteenth
century-in fact, the last civil rights law to be passed by Congress
for 82 years-was in many ways the most forward looking
legislation ever adopted in America." The Civil Rights Act of 1875
("CRA of 1875") was the final attempt of the radical Republicans
to ensure the full inclusion of African Americans into the benefits
and privileges of membership in the American community.9 2 Its
target was nothing less than the daily abuses, discrimination, and
humiliation that characterized the culture of white supremacy and
black subordination, especially in the South.93
If one was inclined to parse out various sub-categories of
civil rights and assert that the CRA had been limited to legal and
economic rights, then the CRA of 1875 promised the full measure
of equality as to "social rights."9 4 As originally introduced in 1870,
the Act prohibited race discrimination in public accommodations:
railroads, restaurants, hotels, theaters, public schools, churches,
Grounded in both the Thirteenth
and even cemeteries.
Amendment's prohibition on the badges and indices of slavery
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
proponents believed that addressing these immediate and
constant manifestations of black oppression was essential to true
freedom.

90. Id. (emphasis added). Miller briefly discussed and quickly dismissed the
butcher's equal protection claim, explaining that this clause only applied to African
Americans and only when states "discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against
them as a class." Id. at 81.
91. LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, INHERENTLY UNEQUAL: THE BETRAYAL OF EQUAL RIGHTS
BY THE SUPREME COURT, 1865-1903, at 99-103 (2011).
92.

GERALD M. POMPER, THE NEW YORK TIMES ON CRITICAL ELECTIONS, 1854-2008,

at 114 (CQ Press 2010).
93. Aderson B. Francois, The Brand of Inferiority: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, White
Supremacy, and Affirmative Action, 57 HOWARD L.J. 573,588 (2013).
94. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
95. Francois, supranote 93, at 575-76.
96. STEPHEN W. STATHIS, LANDMARK DEBATES IN CONGRESS:
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE WAR IN IRAQ 193 (CQPress 2009).
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The debates over the bill forecast many of the arguments
that continue to define the struggle over civil rights." There were
doubts expressed about the federal government's power to
regulate the private actions of individuals," questions raised as to
the significance of government involvement (via trespass laws or
business licensing) with these otherwise private actions," and
concerns regarding possible encroachment on the property rights
of whites.100 The bill eventually passed,'O' although the provisions
regarding schools, churches, and cemeteries were removed' 2 and
an amendment allowing separate but equal facilities was
defeated.'0 o In addition to outlawing segregation in public
accommodations, the Act made persons who violated its
prohibitions subject to criminal liability, including fines and
imprisonment.
Whereas, it is essential to just government we
recognize the equality of all men before the law,
and hold that it is the duty of government in its
dealings with the people to mete out equal and
exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, color,
or persuasion, religious or political; and it being the
appropriate object of legislation to enact great
fundamental principles into law:
Therefore, Be it enacted .. . That all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
and
advantages,
facilities,
accommodations,
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement; .

.

. applicable alike to citizens of every

race and color, regardless of any previous condition
of servitude.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Francois, supra note 93, at 598.
STATHIS, supra note 96.
Francois, supra note 93, at 586.
2 CONG. REC. app. 343 (1874).
Francois, supra note 93, at 580.
3 CONG. REC. app. 939 (1875).

103.

Id.
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That any person who shall violate the foregoing
section

by denying to

any citizen

enjoyment

of

advantages,

facilities, or privileges ...

any

of

the

...

the full

accommodations,
shall, for

every offence, forfeit and pay the sum of five
hundred dollars ...

and shall also, .. . be deemed

guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred
nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be
imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than
one year.10 4

E. The Civil Rights Cases (1883)
The CRA of 1875 was declared unconstitutional just eight
years after it was ratified.105 By that time, the federal commitment
to Reconstruction had ended as part of the compromise to resolve
the contested election of 1876, and racist white Democratic
governments had come back into power in a number of southern
states.1 0 6 Hundreds of cases under the CRA of 1875 had been tried
during the late 1870s and early 1880s, and there was a split in the
circuits as to the constitutionality of the law. 0 7
The Civil Rights Cases were several cases combined that
involved racial discrimination in the admittance to a theater, a
hotel, and seating on a train."o0 These cases had an enormous
significance because they "illuminated the meaning of the racial
caste distinctions in the everyday lives of blacks and whites." 0 9 The
8-1 opinion written by Justice Bradley focused the constitutional
analysis not on the nature of the rights at issue as in Slaughter-

104. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335-336 (1875).
105. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
106. POMPER, supra note 92, at 117.
107. John Hope Franklin, The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 PROLOGUE:J.
NAT'L ARCHIVES 225, 233 (1974).
108. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4-5.
109. HOWARD, supranote 41, at 124.
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House, but on who could be accountable for the abridgement of
those rights. 1 o
At its primary level, the Court's discussion focused on the
Fourteenth Amendment exclusively as a prohibition on
discriminatory action by the state. "It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject matter of the amendment."'" The civil
rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution "cannot be
impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State
authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive
proceedings."'" The private discriminatory act of an individual,
Justice Bradley wrote, "is simply a private wrong" for which the
Constitution can provide no redress."' While this state action
analysis is fairly simple on its face, it should be recognized as the
earliest framing of the distinction between differing models of civil
rights: one model that is focused on reactive non-discrimination;
the other affirmatively promoting equality-and in these cases, by
integration."'4 Justice Bradley's opinion clearly confined the
Fourteenth Amendment to the former." 5
It is absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life,
liberty and property (which include all civil rights
that men have), are by the amendment sought to be
protected against invasion on the part of the State
without due process of law, Congress may therefore

110. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-11, 13-15; see also MichaelJ. Horan, Political
Economy and Sociological Theory as Influences Upon judicial Policy Making: The Civil Rights
Cases of 1883, 16AM.J. LEGAL. HisT. 71,72 (1972).
111. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
112. Id. at 17.
113. Id.
114. Compare id. at 13 (asserting that limiting the Fourteenth Amendment to
protection against state actions adverse to the right of the citizen, secured by the
amendment that embodies reactive non-discrimination as Congress's authority to enforce,
is only a reaction to mischief upon citizens), with id. at 14 (criticizing the 1875 Civil Rights
Amendment as "laying down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each
other, and impos[ing] sanctions for the enforcement of those rules," which would have
affirmatively promoted equality by using Congressional authority to force integration if
adopted).
115. See id. at II (narrowing the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment by limiting
Congress's authority to adopt "appropriate legislation for correcting the effect of such
prohibited State law and State acts" rather than interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
as broad authority for proactive legislation).
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provide due process of law for their vindication in
every case; and that because the denial of a State to
any persons of the equal protection of laws, is
prohibited by the amendment, therefore Congress
may establish laws for their equal protection.' 16
Having disposed of the Fourteenth Amendment argument,
Justice Bradley turned to an analysis of the constitutionality of the
CRA of 1875 under the Thirteenth Amendment, which contains
no similar language limiting its application to state action. "7 While
he recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment was commonly
understood to give Congress the authority to "pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States," he dismissed the idea that overt,
intentional, racial segregation in public accommodations could
possibly be considered a badge or indicia of slavery."' The
opinion concluded with a prescient summary of what has become
a mantra of the modern-day push to restrict all civil rights for
African Americans, made more haunting perhaps by the
realization that it was written only eighteen years after the end of
slavery in America."'
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the
aid of beneficent legislation has shaken of the
inseparable concomitants of that state, there must
be some stage in the progress of his elevation where
he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the laws.1 2 0
Justice Harlan's powerful dissent decries the majority's
abandonment of its duty to ensure that "the full effect be given to

116. Id.atl3.
117. See id. at 23. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I (lacking reference to state
action), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (containing language limiting to state action).
118. Id. at 21. "It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he
will entertain ...

business." Id.
119. Id.at25.
120. Id.

or admit to his theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or
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intent" of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.'2 1 In
determining that intent, Justice Harlan explained that because the
institution of slavery "rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race,
of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved
immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination against
them, because of their race."'22 According to Justice Harlan, if the
amendments have any substantive meaning at all, they must at a
minimum protect African Americans from discrimination "in
respect of any civil right belonging to citizens of the white race in
the same State."'12 As to the idea that the CRA of 1875 is an
attempt to give blacks some favored legal status, Justice Harlan saw
the exact opposite.'12 "The one underlying purpose ... has been
to enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens. The
difficulty has been to compel a recognition of the legal right of the
black race to take the rank of citizens and to secure the enjoyment
of privileges" that come with that status.'2 1
Although not as well known today as the decision thirteen
years later in Plessy v. Ferguson,'26 the Civil Rights Cases were seen at
the time as a crippling blow for African Americans and their
nascent struggle for equality.'12 Looking back from our current
perspective, the decision and the dissent frame out several of the
elements and arguments that have defined the struggle for civil
rights over time and continue to define the debate today,
including questions about institutionalized discrimination, group
fairness, individual rights, affirmative action, and the idea of
"special rights" and so-called identity politics.
F. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and the End of the First
Civil Rights Era
In the aftermath of the election of 1876 and the
concomitant end of Reconstruction,1 28 the often violent
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
Id.at48.
Id. at 61.
Id.

126.

HOWARD, supbra note 41, at 131.

127. Id. Responding to the ruling, Frederick Douglass said: "We have been, as a race,
grievously wounded." Id.
128.

See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCrION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 575-87

(LSU Press 1984).
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ascendancy of white supremacist "Redeemer" state governments
in the former Confederate states,' 29 and the holding in Civil Rights
Cases that "social equality" (as represented by opposition to racial
segregation) was outside the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment,13 0 several states adopted laws mandating segregation
in public accommodations.'' These Jim Crow laws, along with a
coordinated campaign of black disenfranchisement, were an
important tool for the re-emergent white power structure in
dampening down class tensions and potentially bi-racial populist
sentiment. 3 2 White privilege, black subordination, and strict racial
segregation, which were the core components of Jim Crow, helped
support political unity between poor and economically elite
whites, united in racist solidarity.' 3 3
Given the centrality of the lack of state action in the Civil
Rights Cases holdings, however, these new statutes seemed
particularly vulnerable to legal challenge.' 3 4 While the holdings of
the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases were setbacks in
the struggle for racial equality, each case included language that
strongly suggested that state laws requiring and enforcing-in
some places with criminal sanction-segregation would be
unconstitutional.' 3 5 Black and white civil rights advocates quickly
organized to mount a legal challenge.' 3 6
Louisiana passed its law requiring the racial segregation of
railroad passengers in 1890.17 A carefully crafted test case was
subsequently brought relying on both the Thirteenth and

129. HOWARD, supra note 41, at 116.
130. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 59 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
131. By 1892, nine states had adopted laws requiring racial segregation in public
transportation and railroads. See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death
and Resurrection of Radical Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 30, at

181,194.
132.

Id. at 197; see also C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913,

at 211 (1951).
133. Id.
134. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at I I (majority opinion).
135. See id. at 13 (explaining that "prohibitions of the amendment are against State
laws and acts done under State authority"); see also The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
78-79 (1873) (holding that "privileges and immunities . . . are left to the State
governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under the special
care of the Federal government ... until some case involving those privileges makes it
necessary").

136.
137.

See Harris, supra note 131, at 201-02.
Id. at 200-01.
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Fourteenth Amendments. 1 38 In its consideration of the case, the

Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the statute, discounting the
Thirteenth Amendment claim and explaining that "in such
matters, equality, and not identity or community of
accommodations"'

3

is the test of compliance with the Equal

"

Protection Clause, and "the statute applies to the two races with
such perfect fairness and equality." 1o
By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
racial subordination and white supremacy had grown more
entrenched in America,' 4 ' and the dominant mood politically had
almost completely turned against any notions of racial equality. 4 2
The now well-known outcome of the case, endorsing the fictional
idea of "separate but equal," was effectively a fait accompli.1
The Court's 8-1 ruling quickly dismissed the Thirteenth
Amendment claim that state-sanctioned segregation imposed a
"badge of slavery" on blacks.'" As to the Fourteenth Amendment,
the opinion's focus was not on the outcome seemingly mandated
by the Civil Rights Cases (since Plessy challenged state and not
private action)."' Instead, the majority holding harkened back to
the Slaughter-House logic, explaining that there were different
components of civil rights, and that while the Fourteenth
Amendment was written
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the
two races before the law, but in the nature of things
it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguishedfrom political equality, or a commingling

138. Ex partePlessy, 11 So. 948, 949 (La. 1892).
139. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 948.
140. Id. at 951.
141. See Harris, supra note 131, at 208.
142. Id.
143. Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
144. Id. at 542-43 ("That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment ... is
too clear for argument .... A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored race ...

servitude.").
145. Id. at 543-44.

has no tendency to.

reestablish a state of involuntary
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of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to
either.1 46

The opinion reaffirmed the idea that the Constitution and
its civil rights protections had a limited scope, and that rights like
those complained of here, although admittedly impacted by state
action, are outside that scope."' "Separation of the races ...
neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man,
deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor
denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' 4 8 The Court closed by tersely
blaming the victims of racial segregation for any alleged disability
that such treatment imposed.1 49 If segregation by race is itself a
badge of inferiority, "it is not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it."so
Justice Harlan's dissent was a powerful endorsement of a
more sweeping view of the Thirteenth Amendment and its
prohibition of "any burden or disabilities that constitute badges of
slavery or servitude."' 5 ' He argued that such burdens were not
only the effect of laws enforcing segregation, but their intent.' 52
He anticipated that the decision would lead to greater
encroachment on "the admitted rights of colored citizens"153 and
wholly undermine the Reconstruction Amendments, which were
specifically designed to protect those rights.1 54 justice Harlan took
particular issue with the states' role in adopting these Jim Crow
laws, insisting that the Constitution cannot "permit the seed of
race hate to be planted under the sanction of law."' 5 Here was the
most egregious example of the kind of racial discrimination that
every previous decision of the Court had identified as prohibited
by the Reconstruction Amendments, but now the Court refused to

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 544 (emphasis added).
at 556 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
at 548.
at 551.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 555 (Harlan]., dissenting).
at 554-55.
at 560.
at 560-61.
at 560.
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act.' 56 Ironically, the most famous phrase made in support of a
broader vision of racial equality-"Our
constitution is
colorblind"'"-has been removed from its context and now is the
mantra of the opponents of civil rights.'15
While Plessy did not represent a major change or shift in
attitudes or practices regarding race, it did add the Court's
imprimatur to the practice of racial segregation, thereby resorting
to the one potentially counter-majoritarian
branch of
government. 5 9 The decision consolidated the wholesale exclusion
of blacks from the benefits and privileges of membership in the
American community and divorced the status and treatment of
African Americans (and the constitutional amendments designed
to ensure their equality) from any context, purpose, or history,
recasting the then existing inequitable hierarchy of white
supremacy and black subordination as "equal."" As a result, the
constitutional mandate of equal protection was reduced to a
question of equal treatment (e.g., blacks cannot ride in white-only
cars, whites cannot ride in black-only cars) regardless of any
underlying or actual inequalities.'' Over one hundred years and
another civil rights revolution later, the Court continues to
interpret a colorblind constitution as one divorced from context,
history, or entrenched racial disparities.' 6 2

156. See id.
157. Id. at 559.
158. See Ian Hancy-L6pez, Colorblind White Dominance, in WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUcTION OF RACE 157-58 (N.Y.U. Press 2006) ("In the wake of the civil rights
movement's limited but significant triumphs, the relationship between colorblindness and
racial reform changed remarkably. Whereas colorblindness in the context ofJim Crow was
heavy with emancipatory promise, in the civil rights era and since, its greatest potency
instead lies in preserving the racial status quo.").
159.

F. MICHAEL HIGGINISOTHAM, GHOSTS OF JIM CROW: ENDING RACISM IN POST-

RACIAL AMERICA 37-38 (N.Y.U. Press 2013) (discussing the necessity of racial classification
to the maintenance of racial paradigms in the post-slavery era and the Plessy Court's
sanction thereof).
160. SeePlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896) (HarlanJ., dissenting).
16 1. Id.
162. See Chris Edelson, judging in a Vacuum, Or, Once More, Without Feeling: HowJustice
Scalia'sJurisprudentialApproach Repeats ErrorsMade in Plessy v. Ferguson, 45 AKRON L. REV.
513, 514 (2011) (examining the jurisprudential similarities between the majority in Plessy
v. Fergusonand more recent Supreme CourtJustices).
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III. THE PATTERN REPEATS

"It's like ddji vu all over again."
-Yogi Berra' 63
The breathtaking expansion and subsequent backlash and
contraction of civil rights for African Americans over the
approximately thirty-five year span from the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the decision in Plessy has lamentably
repeated itself-albeit somewhat more slowly-over the last
decades of the twentieth century.1 64 The sweeping revolution
promised by the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'6 the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,6' and other civil rights legislation has been

curtailed in many respects by modern Supreme Court decisions
limiting the scope and impact of that promise,"' which reflects a
narrow vision of the benefits and privileges of full inclusion for
people of color in our society.
Although it represents the culmination of decades of a
coordinated litigation strategy to challenge legal segregation,
Brown's reversal of the "separate but equal" doctrine for public
schools is often considered the beginning of the "Second
Reconstruction "-a new era of expanded civil rights legislation
and advocacy and the prospect for meaningful equality for African
Americans.xis Despite the promise of Brown, however, it took

163. Yogi Berra, Yogisims, YOGI BERRA MUSEUM, http://yogiberramuscum.org/just-fo
r-fun/yogisms (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
164. See Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American FortunesInterest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369 (2002)
(explaining that a large driving force for racial equality in the United States was pressure
of the Soviet Union and communism and without the risk of a communism in African
Americans, the U.S. government lacked the incentive to expand civil rights).
165. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953); see also jAMES T. PATTERSON,
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY
70-72 (Oxford U. Press 2001).
166. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
167. See, e.g., Schutte v. Coal. to Def. Allirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1683 (2014);
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 745 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2002).
168. Francisco Valdes, Original Sins, Continuing Wrongs: Equality, Democracy, and
Supremacy in the U.S. UnderjudicialReview, in CONTROVERSIES IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
IN AMERICA: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 30, 36 (Anne Richardson Oakes
ed., 2015); see also C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW 8-9 (Oxford
U. Press 1955).
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another ten years and a massive grassroots movement that exposed
the depth and violence of American racism before Congress
adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.169 The Act was sweeping in
scope-its provisions combatted discrimination in public
accommodations, education, employment, and the expenditure of
federal funds, and also created a federal investigation and
enforcement mechanism to help effectuate the law. 7 0 Anticipating
a challenge to the law as an unconstitutional attempt to regulate
private conduct pursuant to the nineteenth century holding in the
Civil Rights Cases,'' Congress grounded its authority for the Act
not only on the Fourteenth Amendment, but on the Commerce
Clause.' 2 In affirming the constitutionality of the Act, the Court
relied on this provision to distinguish, but not overrule, its 1883
holding.' 7 3
The passage of the 1960s civil rights legislation, with its
focus on the intentional and everyday discrimination that was the
primary
manifestation
of white
supremacy and black
subordination of Jim Crow America, successfully challenged that
discrimination and led to massive changes in all aspects of
American society.' 7 1 In the years following the adoption of these
laws, the nation experienced-yet again-an expansion of civil
rights and the opportunities for full inclusion, and then a
coordinated legal effort, ratified by the Court, to contract and
constrain those opportunities. 75
A. Employment Discrimination
The struggle for racial equality took a momentous step
forward with the 1971 decision Griggs v. Duke Power.'7 1 Prior to the

169. Valdes, supra note 168. The Voting Rights Act arose a year later with the Fair
Housing Act following in 1968. Id.
170. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
171. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-25 (1883).
172. Randall Kennedy, The Struggle for Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, in
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 159 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).

173. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1964).
174. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); id.
175. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 38-39.
176. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
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implementation of the anti-employment discrimination provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Duke Power Company had
policies in place to maintain a rigidly segregated workforce by
restricting black workers to the lowest positions in its plants.'"
When the new civil rights law took effect, the company announced
the desegregation of its workforce and abandoned its overt
discriminatory policies.'7 1 In their place, the company adopted
employment testing and educational criteria that replicated the
existing racial hierarchy of its workplace and prevented African
Americans from being hired or promoted to non-menial
positions.'7

The legal challenge, brought by legendary civil rights
advocate Julius Chambers and the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund,so was based on the theory that the disparate
racial impacts of the facially neutral policy adopted by Duke Power
represented the same noxious and unconstitutional harms as
more intentional disparate treatment cases.' 8 ' According to
Chambers, the new employment policies allowed the company to
lock the prior patterns of inequality and discrimination in place,
thereby maintaining institutionalized inequities even in the
absence of the former racialized policies.' 82 Conversely, Duke
argued that any consideration of its actions or history vis-A-vis its
African American workers prior to the adoption of Title VII was
improper since its discriminatory employment practices were not
illegal at that time.183 All that mattered was that Duke had

when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification.").
177. Id. at 427.
178. Id. at 427-28.
179. Id. (explaining that the new policy required new employees or those seeking to
transfer to any position other than menial "labor department" possess a high school
diploma and pass a standardized test).
180. David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History ofGriggs v. Duke Power Co., 67 VAN ).
L. REV. 197, 206-08 (2014).
181. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1229 (4th Cir. 1970) (plaintiffs
brought suit because new requirements preserved and continued the effects of past racial
discrimination), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
182. Id.
183. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 247 (M.D.N.C. 1968) ("Since the
discrimination occurred prior to July 2, 1965, it is not remedial under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act."), affd in part, revd in part, 420 F.2d 1225, 1229 (4th Cir. 1970), revd, 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
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eliminated those practices when the new law went into effect.'
The company's position meant that any appropriate analysis of its
actions must begin at the adoption of the Act, disconnected from
the context and history within which the Civil Rights Act was
adopted.' 8 5

'

The Supreme Court disagreed.' 8 1 Its unanimous decision
recognized that employment practices and procedures "neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices."' The Court also found
that disparate impact was distinct from, but no less nefarious than
disparate treatment, stating that "good intent or the absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups."' 8
...
The focus was not on the motivation behind the challenged
practices, but on their consequences.' 89
The opinion was a forceful endorsement of a sweeping
vision of civil rights, and one that was vital if the law was to reach
the practices that created and maintained institutional
discrimination. The disparate impact analysis at the core of the
Court's holding recognized the subtle but no less malignant forms
of race discrimination that continued to plague people of color,
even as more blatant discriminatory actions became illegal (and
over time, socially unpopular).'" Critical to the decision in Griggs,
and to the disparate impact theory more generally, is that
recognition of the context and continuing effects of our history of
intentional racial discrimination is necessary to our efforts to fully
remedy existing inequities.' 9
While the Court embraced the concept of disparate impact
within the context of Title VII, just four years later it rejected a

184.
185.

Id. at 248.
Id.
186. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
187. Id. at 430.
188. Id. at 432.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of
DisparateImpact in the Roberts Court, 66 AIA. L. REv. 656-60 (2015) (discussing Griggs and
reviewing disparate impact as a way to reach covert intentional discrimination, implicit
bias, and structural discrimination).
19 1. Id.

WAKE FORESTJOURNAL OFLAW & POLICY

64

[Vol. 6:1

similarly broad vision for claims under the Equal Protection
Clause.' 92 Like Griggs, Washington v. Davis involved the disparate
impact of an employment test, in this case, given to recruits for the
Washington, D.C., police force.' 93 Because Title VII did not apply
to federal employees at the time of complaint, the African
American applicants excluded by the test results filed suit directly
under the Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.'" The Court
of Appeals analogized the case to Griggs and, relying on the
disparate impact model established there, ruled in favor of the
applicants.' 9 5

The Supreme Court reversed that ruling, emphasizing that
the statutory disparate impact paradigm of racial discrimination
"is not the constitutional rule."' 9 6 While agreeing that a showing
of a "disproportionate impact is not irrelevant," the majority
nonetheless held that proof of intentional discrimination was
necessary to trigger a constitutional equal protection claim."' In
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressed "difficulty in
understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral
qualification ...

is nevertheless racially discriminatory . . . simply

because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify."' 9 8 Gone
was the bold and promising language about "freezing"'" the racial
status quo or "built-in headwinds."o Instead, the Court focused
on the slippery slope of what institutional racism-the privileges
and immunities (or conversely, the badges and incidents)-that
these provisions were designed to address."
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends
is
nevertheless
invalid,
absent
compelling
justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one

192. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976).
193. Id. at 232-33.
194. Id. at 233. Section 1981 is the modern codification of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.
195. See generally Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
196. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
197. Id. at 242.
198. Id. at 245.
199. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
200. Id. at 432.
201. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
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race more than another would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public
services, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may
be more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white. 202
Exactly. The Court identifies a number of aspects of society
where we would likely find racially disparate impacts of facially
neutral policies, and then simply states that they are beyond the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 3
Although Davis was an employment discrimination case
factually focused on a narrow question of employment tests, the
decision established the constitutional requirement for proving
intent in any discrimination case brought under the Equal
Protection Clause.204 Even the decision maker's knowledge of the
foreseeable and predictable discriminatory effects of a proposed
policy or procedure was insufficient. 205 Following Davis, and reaffirmed repeatedly by similar cases, 06 plaintiffs would have to
prove that such policies were adopted because of those
discriminatory outcomes and not merely in spite of them.20 7
By the late 1980s, the Court was making a concerted effort
to limit the scope of Title VII. 20 8 In two major decisions recasting

202. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43
N.C. L. REV. 271 (1965); Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation:A Constitutionaland
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 300 (1972); William Silverman, Equal Protection,
Economic Legislation, and RacialDiscrimination,25 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1972)).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 246-48.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); McCleskeyv. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
207. See, e.g., Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (finding
that "discriminatory purpose" implies that the employer selected or reaflirmed a course
of action "because of," and not merely "in spite of," its potential adverse effects on a
particular group); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (finding that while the
facially-neutral test had a disproportionate impact on African-American applicants, it was
not a discriminatory device).
208. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the
scope of actionable conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to not apply to on-the-job racial
harassment), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Acts of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105
Stat. 1071, 1071-72, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (tightening the standards of proof required for a disparate
impact claim), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra.
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the law more favorably for employers, the Court substantially
increased the burden of proof on plaintiffs in disparate impact
cases, 209 and determined that in disparate treatment cases even if
the plaintiff could prove a discriminatory motive, the employer
could avoid liability by showing it would have taken the adverse
action even absent the illegitimate motive. 1 o In the wake of these
and other decisions circumscribing civil rights legislation,'
Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically to
address the impacts of the Court's actions.2 1 2 Among other
elements, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 formally codified the
disparate
impact
paradigm
for
proving
employment
discrimination. 211
Most recently, the Court has considered whether the
disparate impact model and the related remedies might in and of
themselves constitute intentional discrimination against white
workers. 214 The City of New Haven refused to certify the results of
a test for promotions in the firefighting department because it
concluded that the test had a disparate impact on African
American and Hispanic firefighters. 2" A group of white
firefighters that passed the exam then filed suit, claiming the city's
refusal to certify the test constituted intentional racial
discrimination against them. 216 In attempting to reconcile the

interests

of the

disparate impact

and disparate

treatment

209. Wards Cove Packing Co., at 659-60 (holding that the burden of persuasion always
remains with the plaintiff to show lack of business in a disparate impact claim under Title
VII necessity).
210. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187 (holding that an employer can rebut the inference
of discriminatory intent by presenting evidence that the applicant was rejected for a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason).
211. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral attack of a
consent decree containing an affirmative action plan); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989) (limiting liability for an employer in a mixed-motive claim under Title
VIl).
212. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in part in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1991)). Further, the Act stated that
the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. weakened the scope and
effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections." Id. at § 2.
213. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § § 703(k) (2012).
214. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (questioning whether an employer
can reject results from a valid exam when the results unintentionally block the promotion
of minority candidates).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 574.
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components of Title VII, and more specifically whether the intent
to comply with the former could be a legitimate defense to claims
under the latter, the Court tipped the scales in favor of intentional
discrimination. 7
Analogizing to its narrow view of affirmative action
remedies under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
concluded that an employer would have to demonstrate "a strong
basis in evidence" that it would face disparate impact liability in
order to justify what the Court accepted would constitute
intentional discrimination against white workers.118 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia goes a step further, arguing that
disparate impact is fundamentally at odds with the Court's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence regarding intentional
discrimination. 21 9 Disparate impact remedies "place a racial thumb
on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial
outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on
[because of] those racial outcomes. That type of racial decision
making is ... discriminatory." 2 20 Put another way, the attempts to
address institutionalized racism necessarily constitutes intentional
discrimination against whites and therefore cannot be
constitutional.2 2 1 Scalia's opinion concludes with a prediction-or
perhaps more candidly an invitation-that the Court must soon
address "the war" between disparate impact and equal
protection.
B. Education
The window of opportunity for addressing institutional
discrimination in education was short lived. The decade following
the landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (in part
because of its ambiguity about remedy and its cryptic demand for
resolution with "all deliberate speed")2 2 1 foreshadowed the

217. Id. at 583.
218. Id. at 585. The Court acknowledged that while "the racial adverse impact here
was significant," the city failed to meet the new evidentiary standard; therefore, it granted
summaryjudgment for the white firefighters. Id. at 586-87.
219. Id. at 594 (Scalia,J., concurring).
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 595-96.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown l), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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arguments in Griggs. Did Brown require that school districts simply
stop deliberately segregating students by race, or that they take
affirmative measures to integrate schools?22 4 Following outright
resistance to the Court's holding, school districts and state
governments begrudgingly chose the former.225 As a result, there
was minimal change in the racial demographics in American
public schools for more than ten years.
It was not until Green v. New Kent County that the Court
resolved that the Constitution demanded more than simply
ending de jure school segregation and adopting purportedly race
neutral policies that locked in place the racial hierarchy of the
status quo.22 7 The unanimous decision in Green established that
once a school district has been found constitutionally liable for
operating a segregated system, it has an "affirmative duty to take
whatever steps necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."22 ' A
desegregation plan must be "meaningful and immediate," and the
Court identified specific factors to measure whether a district had
in fact become fully integrated.2 29 Recognizing that the legacy of
legal residential segregation in the United States could, without
direct intervention, allow school districts to easily maintain a
system of racially isolated schools, the Court went on to authorize
specific, direct remedies to affirmatively achieve school
integration, including the use of cross-district busing.3 0

224. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (finding that Congress did not
intend for Title Vll to require an employer to provide ajob for every applicant regardless
of qualifications; rather, Title VII seeks to remove employer practices that are overtly
discriminatory and practices that are facially-neutral, but discriminatory in operation);
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (holding that courts have authority to force school districts to
integrate to achieve a system of admissions to public schools on a nonracial basis and that
school districts have the authority to implement integration programs in accordance with
constitutional principles).
225.

MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 234-42 (Oxford U. Press 1994)

(illustrating how Brown's scope was limited in practice because it opened the door to
various, non-explicit methods of noncompliance).
226. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, 755-56 (Vintage Books 2004); DERRICK
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, 94-97 (Oxford U. Press 2004).

227. Green v. New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
228. Id. at 437-38.
229. Id. at 439. The six Green factors are (1) student assignment, (2) faculty, (3) staff,
(4) transportation, (5) extracurricular activities, and (6) facilities. Id.
230. Id. at 442 n.6.
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Keyes v. School District No. 1 presented the Court with an
opportunity to more fully address the exclusion and segregation of
students of color in public schools."' The case out of Denver was
the first the Court considered from outside the South," and
consequently, the first where the school district effectively created
and maintained segregated schools without a formal dejure policy
of racial segregation-which, to this point, had been the basis of
constitutional liability."' This factual scenario offered the Court
had the opportunity to adopt a discriminatory impact standard for
school segregation.2 34 There were, in fact, five members of the
Court prepared to recognize that de facto segregation-and
facially neutral policies or practices that furthered or exacerbated
such segregation-violated the Equal Protection Clause.2 35 Justice

Powell was the necessary fifth vote to abandon the distinction, but
he wanted his colleagues to pull back on the holding in Swann and
its endorsement of busing, to which he remained staunchly
opposed.3
Unable to put together the five votes necessary to adopt a
disparate impact model for school segregation, the Court
nonetheless held that the district policies and practices in Denver
had intentionally created racially segregated schools. 2 3 ' While this

meant that school districts anywhere in the country could
potentially be liable for unconstitutional racial segregation,2 38 what
had been lost was summed up by Justice Powell's concurring and
dissenting opinion."' He noted that school segregation was always
traceable to some form of state action or inaction, and identified a
range of racially neutral policy decisions that could have the effect
of increasing segregation-or failing to remedy it-for which
school districts should be held liable, including school
construction and siting decisions, the creation of attendance

231. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973).
232. Id. at 217.
233. Id. at 198-99.
234. Id. at 198-200 (noting Denver's school system never had a statutorily imposed
dual system like many states in the South).
235. Id. at 201-202.
37 3
236. Id. at 2 - 9, 242, 248-51.
237. Id. at 213.
238. Id. at 200, 208-09.
239. Id. at 217-53 (Poweli,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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zones, recruitment and assignment of teachers, and school
closures and consolidation.
Education cases decided in the wake of Keyes relied on and
further entrenched the de jure/de facto (read: intent/impacts)
distinction."' As a result, ostensibly neutral school board policies
and practices that produced the same segregative outcomes and
related harms as intentional discrimination would remain
untouched by the courts.24 2 Milliken v. Bradley was in many respects
the crystallization of what had been lost in Keyes. 24 In the late
1960s and early 1970s, white flight from Detroit left the city school
district overwhelmingly racially isolated. By 1973, 133 of Detroit's
schools were over ninety percent African American, while the city
was surrounded by over fifty suburban, majority white districts.24 4
The lower courts found intentional discrimination and held that
the only way to achieve desegregation was through a multi-district
plan that would include the city and the suburban schools. 245 The
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that since no
intentionally segregative actions of the suburban districts had
created the discrimination
in Detroit, it was "wholly
impermissible" to impose an inter-district remedy.
Noting that
judicial action encroaching on local control of schools "is contrary
2
to the history of public education in our country,"a
the decision
sanctioned "white flight" away from attempts at integration and
insulated the suburbs from the continuing efforts to desegregate
urban school districts. 2 48

240. Id. at 240-42 (Powell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
242. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 159, at 128 (noting that many school desegregation
plans failed because of white flight).
243. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717.
244. Id. at 735, 740, 800.
245. Id. at 717-18.
246. Id. at 745.
247. Id. at 741.
248. Id. at 742-43.Justice Marshall, in an eloquent and portentous dissent, wrote:
Today's holding, I fear is more a reflection of a perceived public mood
that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee
of equal justice than it is of neutral principles of law. In the short run, it
may seem the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be

divided up into two cities-one white and one black-but it is a course, I
believe, our people will ultimately regret.
Id. at 814-15 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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By the 1980s and 1990s, the movement away from school
integration as a constitutional and civil rights priority accelerated
as districts formerly under court order to desegregate were
declared unitary (fully integrated), removed from judicial
oversight, and then prohibited from considering race in any
future efforts to maintain or promote the integration they had
worked so hard to achieve."' In Freeman v. Pitts, in addition to
holding that school districts under court order could achieve
partial or incremental determination of unitary status,so the Court
held that that the causal connection between any current racial
imbalances and the de jure constitutional violation (formerly a
presumption that the school district would have to rebut) may
have been broken years prior to the declaration of unitary status,
and that a district could still be declared unitary despite having
become resegregated.m
The case from Dekalb County, Georgia, involved a black
student population that went from 5.6% at the time the
desegregation order was entered in 1969 to 47% in 1986.5 The
Court found that demographic shifts were the cause of significant
racial imbalances in the county schools, and that these current
disparities were unrelated to prior de jure segregation. 53 This
ahistorical view of residential segregation, severed from its Jim
Crow roots, led the Court to ignore the present statistical evidence
showing that the ratio of black students to white students in
individual schools varied to a significant degree from the systemwide average-the judicial benchmark for determining student
integration. 2 54 The Court then concluded that the district's
student assignment plan to close black schools and reassigning
pupils to neighborhood schools255 fully complied with the
desegregation orders and that unitary status had already been

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-92 (1992).
Id. at 489-91.
Id. at 496, 498.
Id. at 475.
253. Id. at 494-96.
254. Id. at 476, 495; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 25
(1971) ("Awareness of the racial composition of the whole school system is likely to be a
useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations.").
255. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493 (1992).
249.
250.
251.
252.
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achieved in the area of student assignment, regardless of the
disparities that existed in the years that followed.1 6
It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical
ability of the federal courts to try to counteract
these
kinds
of continuous
and
massive
demographic shifts. To attempt such results would
require ongoing and never-ending supervision by
the courts of school districts simply because they
were once de jure segregated. Residential housing
choices, and their attendant effects on the racial
composition of schools, present an ever-changing
pattern, one difficult to address through judicial
remedies.2 5 7

Finally, in 2007, the Court issued a coup de grdce for school
diversity advocacy in the federal courts.5 While the divided
opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 125' nominally reaffirmed the constitutional value of
promoting racial diversity in public K-12 education, the decision
significantly restricted what school districts could do to accomplish
integration with student assignment.6' The case involved two
different school districts-Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson
County (Louisville), Kentucky.26 ' Both districts had implemented
voluntary student assignment plans that included consideration of
race as one of several factors used to assign students and promote
school diversity.26 2 The Seattle school district was never subject to a

256. Id. at 493-94.
257. Id. at 495. The Court also emphasized that the passage of time since the dejure
violation may be a critical factor in determining the significance of any current racial
imbalances. See id. at 496.
258. Parents Involved in CmLy. Sch. v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-721 (2007).
259. Id. at 724, 771, 782.
260. Id. at 720-21, 730-33. Ironically, in overruling a school-district-implemented
voluntary student integration plans, the ParentsInvolved court ignored its almost universal

precedents lionizing the principal of local control of schools. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 43 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) ("[L]ocal autonomy of school districts is. a vital
national tradition."); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) ("No single tradition li
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operadon of
schools.").
261. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 701.
262. Id.at710.
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judicial desegregation order. Jefferson County had been under
court order for decades but was declared unitary in 2000.263
The Court issued a fractured opinion finding that these
voluntary integration plans violated the Constitution.2 " A majority
of the Justices, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, agreed that
promoting diversity and eliminating racially isolated schools was a
legitimate and compelling interest for school boards,6 and that
they could adopt voluntary assignment plans to further that
interest, but that the plans adopted in Seattle and Louisville were
not sufficiently limited to survive strict judicial scrutiny. 6 6 Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
argued vehemently that racial integration and student diversity are
not compelling interests in K-12 schools, and therefore would
prohibit any consideration of race.
Although Justice Kennedy voted to strike down the
particular Seattle and Louisville plans, he stressed that the holding
did not ban districts from developing policies to promote diverse
schools, as long as those policies did not include any specific racebased classifications or assignment of a particular student.2 6 8 School
districts remained free, however, to devise race-conscious measures
that address the problem of segregation and resegregation in a
general way." Ironically, some of the very measures Justice
Kennedy recommended-siting of new schools, drawing
attendance zones, and targeted recruitment of students and
teachersM -were the very ones Justice Powell listed as the kind
that can produce the discriminatory disparate impacts that the
Court said (then and now) were beyond the reach of the
Constitution.2 7 1

263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 716 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 783 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 786-87 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
267. Id. at 746 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Claiming that the use of race in this case
was as pernicious as the legal segregation challenged in Brown, the Chief justice wrote,
"When it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard." Id.
268. Id. at 797-98 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
269. Id at 789 (Kcnnedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
270. Id.
271. Seediscussion infraSection II.B.
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C. Title VI
Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act was one of the broader
provisions of the statute, prohibiting discrimination in any
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. 72
Commenting on this portion of the legislation, President John F.
Kennedy said, "Simple justice requires that public funds, to which
all taxpayers of all races [colors, and national origins] contribute,
not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches,
subsidizes or results in racial [color or national origin]
discrimination." 7' Given the federal funding of a broad range of
state and local government programs, Title VI created a tool to
challenge
governmental
discrimination
in
housing,
transportation, land use planning and zoning, environmental
regulation, education (K-12 and higher education), and health
care. 274 Like other sections of the Act, Title VI provided that a
party challenging discrimination could file an administrative civil
rights complaint with the federal agency that provided the
funding or pursue direct legal action in the judicial system.
For decades, Title VI and its implementing regulations
were interpreted to prohibit both intentional and disparate impact
discrimination.2 76 As a practical matter, the availability of a cause
of action to challenge discriminatory effects was particular crucial
to effectuating the full measure of the Civil Rights Act since the
subject matter of the challenge was often some government
decision or policy for which the likelihood of proving intent was
nearly impossible, especially under the Washington v. Davis
"because of" standard.7 The disparate impact theory was often
critical to challenging the placement of hazardous waste facilities
and other unwanted land uses in minority communities, 278 in

272. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
273. Memorandum from jocelyn Samuels, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen. for Civ. Rts at U.S.
Dep't ofJustice to Title VI Staff 2 (July 24, 2014), http://www.justicc.gov/crt/title-vi-civil-r
ights-act-1964-42-usc-i-2000d-ct-seq (discussing the 50th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and announcement of the new government-wide Title VI Coordination Initiative).
274. Id. at 1.
275. Id. at 4.
276. Id. at 2.
277.

Civ. RTS. Div., U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 52 (1998), http:/

/www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/ 1998/09/23/legalman.pdf.
278. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envil. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486
(D. N.J. 2003).
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securing access to basic public services in those same
communities,"' and to combatting other disparate land use
decisions. 280 Disparate impact implicitly recognizes the legacy and
continuing patterns of intentional residential discrimination and
segregation, and the institutionalization of those patterns by
ostensibly neutral practices that in fact serve to permanently freeze
the discriminatory status quo.
Although a private cause of action to challenge disparate
impact discrimination under Title VI had been recognized and
endorsed by every U.S. Court of Appeals,' the Supreme Court
reached out and granted certiorariin 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval
case to determine solely "whether private individuals may sue to
enforce the disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."212 The case involved a class
action suit against Alabama's Department of Public Safety that,
pursuant to the state's 1990 "English-only" policy, chose to
administer the driver's license exam only in English.2 " The
plaintiffs claimed, under Title VI, that the policy had a
discriminatory impact on non-English-speakers based on their
national origin. 8 The Federal District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, agreeing that Alabama's
policy violated the statutory prohibition against discrimination.28 5
Interestingly, the Court specifically set aside the substantive
question of whether the English-only policy constituted
impermissible discrimination, and instead singularly focused on
the wholly procedural issue of whether a private right of action
existed to sue for disparate impact discrimination, or whether only
federal agencies could pursue such litigation.28 1 In a 5-4 decision
written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that careful reading of the

279. See Comm. Concerning CmLy. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690
(9th Cir. 2009).
280. See Houston v. City of Cocoa, NO. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla, Dec. 22, 1989)
(consent order).
281. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 294 (2001) (Stevens,J. dissenting).
282. Id. at 278.
283. Id. at 279.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 279-80 (stating there was no dispute that there was a private right of action
to challenge intentional discrimination).
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implementing regulations demonstrated that the language
creating a private right of action to challenge intentional
discrimination did not apply to the disparate impact regulations.
Despite the dissent's urging that the statute be read in context:
"[A] ny statutory provision whose stated purpose is to 'effectuate'
the eradication of racial and ethnic discrimination has as its
'focus' those individuals who, absent such legislation, would be
subject to discrimination ,""2 the only remedy for disparate impact
under Title VI in the wake of Sandoval is through the
administrative complaint and enforcement process.28 9

D. Housing
Of all the 1960s era civil rights legislation, the Fair Housing
Act ("FHA") was envisioned to be the most far reaching.2 0 The
legislative history, language, and ongoing interpretation
demonstrate that the legislation was deliberately designed to have
a broader scope than simply eliminating housing discrimination
2
against people of color."
' In the debates leading to the passage of
the bill, sponsor Senator Walter Mondale stated that the purpose
of the act was to create "truly integrated and balanced living
patterns."2 92 New York Congressman William Ryan said the FHA
would help the nation "achieve the aim of an integrated
society."2

The FHA itself is explicit on this point by requiring the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to
"administer programs and activities related to housing ...
in a
manner affirmatively to further the policies of [the FHA] "2" This

language evokes the ruling in Green and its message that merely
ending overt discrimination would not be sufficient to address the
constitutional liabilities of decades of white supremacy and black

287. Id. at 288.Justice Scalia's parsing of the language of Section 601 and Section 602
is evocative of the Court's dissection of the citizenship language in the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases. Id.; The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873).
288. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 316 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 315 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
290. 113 CONG. REC. 22,689 (1967) (statement of Rep. Montgomery).
291. 114 CONG. REC. 9,566 (1968) (statement of Rep. Latta).
292. 114 CONG. REc. 3,422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
293. 114 CONG. REC. 9,591 (1968) (statement of Rep. Ryan).
294. Fair Housing Act, 42 USC §3608(e)(5)(1968) (emphasis added).
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subordination.29 The Court emphasized this broad vision of the
FRA in one of its earliest rulings, when it held that white tenants
in a building that excluded African Americans has standing to sue
because the white tenants had suffered a direct injury to a right
protected by the FHA-the right to live in an integrated
community.29 6

Given this sweeping affirmative mandate, HUD regulations
and enforcement have depended substantially on the disparate
impact paradigm to achieve the legislative goals. 29 ' As Senator
Mondale recognized, much of the housing segregation in America
was the result of "the policies and practices of agencies of
government at all levels." 29 8 Because many of those policies and
practices are implemented without any overt or express racial
animus, it is necessary to be able to challenge the discriminatory
effects of exclusionary land use and zoning decisions, denial of
development permits, attempts to concentrate or prohibit lowincome housing, and a range of other facially neutral government
actions that undermine or inhibit racial integration-in other
words, to address the structural component of residential
segregation.
It is no wonder then-given the Court's growing hostility to
considering discriminatory effects-that the FHA has been in its
crosshairs. In the last few years, the Court granted certiorari in
three cases specifically to consider the issue of whether the FHA
permits the use of disparate impact.29 9 Anticipating that the Court
has taken these cases with the goal of eliminating disparate impact
under the FHA, advocates worked diligently to settle two of the
cases before the Justices had an opportunity to rule.oo

Green v. New Kent Cn ty., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1967).
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
297. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2014); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's
Discriminatory Eflects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460-70 (Feb. 15, 2013); POVERTY & RACE
295.
296.

RES. ACTION COUNCIL, AFIrATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING AT HUD: A FIRST TERM

REPORT CARD (Jan. 2013), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/HUDFirstTermReportCard.pdf
298. 114 CONG. REC. 2,277 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
299. William F. Fuller, What's HUD Got to Do With It?: How HUD's DisparateImpact Rule
May Save the Fair Housing Act's DisparateImpact Standard, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047, 2049
(2015). As was the case with Sandoval and Tile VI, there is no dispute on the issue among
the circuit courts. Id.

300. Magner v. Gallagher, No. 10-1032 (U.S. 2001), was granted certiorari on
November 7, 2001, and was set to be argued February 29, 2012. It was settled and
dismissed on February 10th. A little more than a year later onJune 17, 2013, another case,
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The Court finally had a chance to fully consider the
question in 2015, and in a decision that surprised (and relieved)
many civil rights advocates,o the Court affirmed the use of
disparate impact under the FHA.1 12 Texas Department of Housing
Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. involved
an FHA challenge to the process by which Texas allocated its Low
Income Housing Tax Credits, arguing that the program
disproportionately concentrated affordable housing developments
in minority neighborhoods and away from majority white areas.303
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy affirmed the use of disparate
impact, noting that litigation targeting government decisions like
zoning laws or affordable housing policies "reside at the heartland
of disparate-impact liability," 304 and that such actions permit
"plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised
animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment. "305
The opinion was neither an unqualified endorsement, nor
a complete break from rulings that narrowed or eliminated any
consideration

of race in government decision-making.3 06 With

specific nods to ParentsInvolved and Ricci, Justice Kennedy made a
point to note there were limitations on disparate impact, that such
cases must require more than evidence of statistical disparity, and
that when disparate impact liability is found, "remedial orders
must be consistent with the Constitution[, and] [C]ourts should
strive to design them to eliminate racial disparities though race30
neutral means."o
Despite these cautions and a call for strict
review of disparate impact claims, however, the opinion ends on
the positive note that "against the backdrop of disparate-impact
liability ...

many cities have become more diverse.... The Court

Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. CL. 2824
(2013), came before the court. The case was set for argument on December 4, 2013, and
was settled on November 15, 2013. Id.
301.

Pema Levy, Justice Anthony Kennedy just Saved a Major Civil Rights Law, MOTHER

JONES (June 25, 2015, 11:13 AM), http://www.mothedones.com/politics/2015/06/supre
me-court-fair-housing-act.
302. Id.
303. Tex. Dep'. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 135 S. CL
2507 (2015).
304. Id. at 17.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 18.
307. Id. at 22.
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acknowledges the Fair Housing Act's continuing role in moving
the Nation toward a more integrated society."308
IV. WHAT Is To BE DONE?

In order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race. There is no other way. And in
order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection
Clause
perpetuate
racial
supremacy.
-Justice Harry Blackmun30 9
The primary good we distribute to one another as a society
is full and equal membership in the human community. Visualize
American society as a circle. Within that circle everyone enjoys the
same rights, privileges, benefits, and opportunities as every other
person within the circle. But individuals and groups that are left
outside the circle are effectively and deliberately excluded from
the benefits-the civil rights-that those inside the circle share.
To justify that exclusion, those on the inside render those
excluded as subordinate and dehumanized. This rationalization
not only ensures that those on the outside-those "nonpersons"-do not share the benefits of the membership, but also
institutionalizes the belief that they are inferior or unworthy
individuals or groups who neither deserve, nor are entitled to be
included. That is the lie of the "other," and it depends upon
separation and isolation in our schools, in our neighborhoods, in
ourjobs, and in our access to political power.
The struggle to expand that circle of inclusion is the
continuing struggle for civil rights. The long and arduous
movement for equality has been, at some fundamental level,
grounded in the belief that the American promise means that the
circle can and must expand and embrace us all.s1 o Yet even as
society has been able to reduce or eliminate many of the most
overt forms of discrimination, the vestiges of our legacy of

308. Id. at 24.
309. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 468 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
310. See, e.g., Symposium, PromotingRacial Equality: ConstitutionalLawyering in the 21st
Century, 9J.L. POL'Y 347 (2000).
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institutionalized inequity persist and are even reinforced.
Statistical data on a number of societal metrics show significant
disparities between whites and blacks in education,
employment,3 13 income and wealth,314 exposure to environmental
and interaction with
hazards or unwanted land uses,3"' health,
3
1
the criminal justice system. 1 Yet the Court's limited
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and other civil rights
legislation applying only to intentional discrimination puts many
of these ongoing inequities beyond their reach.3 1' As a result,
society finds itself at a point in the continuing civil rights struggle
not unlike the United States post-Plessy. The Court has again
realigned the relationship of the law and the nature of
discrimination faced by people of color, detaching the actual
status and experience of African Americans from the goals,
context, and history of the movement towards full inclusion, and
once again attempting to define as a matter of constitutional law
that the existing inequities are in fact a balanced, "post-racial"
clean slate.
What are civil rights laws designed to do? What are the
harms they are-or should be-expected to address? The
continuing reliance on intent imposes a narrow, personal tortbased approach to civil rights with a focus on a bad actor
motivated by a conscious desire to do harm. But that is no longer
the reality of discrimination in America. If tort law is the analogy
on which we rely, perhaps the model for civil rights should be
more like product liability, where the motive of the manufacturer

311. Brad Plumer, These Ten Charts Show the Black-White Economic Gap Hasn't Budged in
50 Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp
/2013/08/28/hcse-seven-charts-show-the-black-white-economic-gap-hasn-budged-in-50-y
ears.

312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Symposium, supra note 310 (explaining the difficulties of combating
discriminatory practices within the context of policing because of the lack of explicit
intent and racial animus).
319. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2633, (2013) (Ginsburg, ].,
dissenting) ("[T]hc Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to
block that discrimination.").
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of a defective product is not important; the issue is whether the
product causes an injury.120 The law in that context looks at
impacts and effects, not intent. Civil rights law should do the
same.
Given the many success of the civil rights legislation of the
1960s in addressing the intentional discrimination that
characterized our nation for the one hundred years preceding
their passage,' we now need a Civil Rights Act for the twenty-first
century specifically intended to address the continuing
manifestations of institutional discrimination that characterize our
nation today.
The new legislation should be grounded in the Thirteenth
Amendment and its developed jurisprudence about the badges
and indicia of slavery and a renewed assessment of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, which recognizes
that the full and equal inclusion in American society is at the core
of that provision. With that constitutional pedigree, the new Civil
Rights Act should target the policies and practices that produce,
compound, or exacerbate racial disparities across the full
spectrum of our society. The new legislation should be modeled
on the general principles and theory of disparate impact
discrimination. Upon a showing by a plaintiff that a facially neutral
policy or action produced significantly disproportionate racial
outcomes, the burden of proof would switch to the defendant to
demonstrate some important interest that justified that action or
policy. 2 2 The plaintiff would then have the opportunity to show
that this reason was insufficient or, merely pretextual, and to offer
some reasonable, less-discriminatory alternative. 2' The new
legislation would apply to the full range of government actions
that produce disparate racial outcomes, as well as impose an
additional burden on government decision-making, particularly

320. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY lAW 245 (3d. ed. 2015).
321. Marianne Engelman Lado, Unfinished Agenda: The Need for Civil Rights Litigation to
Address Race Discriminationand Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, 6 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R.
1,5 (2001).
322. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The term
"important" is used here specifically in relation to intermediate scrutiny pursuant to equal
protection jurisprudence. The specific intent of this proposed new law-to dismantle
institutional racism-justifies requiring heightened scrutiny to any proffered justification
for racially disparate impacts.
323. Id. at 804.
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when the disparate impacts on any proposed policy are
foreseeable and predictable.
It is important to note that what is being suggested here is
not an affirmative action or other retroactive remedial program
aimed at addressing the effects of some particular past intentional
discrimination that no longer takes place. 2 That paradigm, which
is the one that persists in education, for example, maintains the de
jure/de facto distinction and creates a temporal limitation on
addressing the continuing segregation and resegregation of
schools. 25 The requirement of showing that intentional
discrimination is directly and causally linked to current racial
disparities necessarily characterizes and limits any integrative
efforts as purely remedial of this prior intentional injury. As the
country moves further in time from the era of de jure segregation,
the causal connection becomes more challenging to demonstrate
despite widespread resegregation.3 26 This limited focus on intent
relieves a school district of any liability for the new or continuing
segregative impacts of actions it has taken (or failed to take) since
the elimination of legal segregation. The country is back in the
days before Keyes, when a school's only obligation with regard to
race is to not intentionally assign individual students by race.
The fact that schools in many parts of the country are as
segregated as they were before 1970-primarily as a result of
policies and practices of school boards-is of no legal
consequence.3 2 8 The segregated ends are judicially irrelevant; all
that matters are the means by which the nation arrived there. A
new Civil Rights Act would invert that retrogressive paradigm.

324. Such programs remain a critical component in dismantling the hierarchy of
institutional discrimination and are often blurred with efforts to address foreseeable
disparate

impacts. Court decisions on affirmative action, however, have significantly

narrowed their scope and reach. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
325. SeeJonathan Fischbach, Will Rhee & Robert Cacace, Race as the Pivot Point: The
Future of Race-Based Policies to Remedy Dejure Segregation After Parents Involved in Community

Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491,493-94 (2008).
326. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 753 n.6
(Thomas, J., concurring).
327. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Court'sRole, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1609 (2003).
328.

GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 13 (The

Civil Rights Project Harv. Univ. ed., 1999).
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Opposition to a disparate impact-based Civil Rights Act
would likely echo criticisms of current legislation that recognizes
such discrimination: it leads to decision-making based on race,
which is antithetical to the struggle for civil rights; it exacerbates
racial tension and hostility by making race the central issue in
evaluating or implementing public policy; it violates the ideal of a
color-blind society; and it transforms individual and personal
rights into amorphous group rights and racial entitlements.' The
law, critics assert, can only guarantee equal treatment, not equal
outcomes.
The primary problem with this critique is that it
decontextualizes the nature of modem race discrimination and
the practical experiences of people of color in America. It is an
analysis of race and racism completely divorced from its structural
foundations of white supremacy, black subordination, and the
institutionalized qualities of racial segregation and exclusion. The
idea that considering discriminatory racial impacts will increase
racial tension is premised on the belief that there is little or no
racial tension now-a belief that grows out of the ability of many
whites to externalize the concept of race, and which was most
recently exposed as false by the high profile killings of black men
by white police officers in Ferguson,ss
Staten Island,"
Charleston,m and Charlotte.
Limiting the reach of civil rights law to intentional
discrimination or remedial efforts only to equal treatment is
premised on the fundamentally flawed idea that the adoption of
laws prohibiting discriminatory treatment-the civil rights

329. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, The Supreme Court's Bad 'DisparateImpact' Decision, NAT'L
REV. Uune 25, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.nationalrcview.com/article/420319/supremccourts-bad-disparate-impact-decision-roger-clegg.
330. Ray Sanchez, Michael Brown Shooting, Protests Highlight Racial Divide, CNN (Aug.
15, 2014, 10:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/14/justice/ferguson-missouri-policecommunity/indcx.html.
331. Ray Sanchez, Police Chokehold Death Sparks New York Protest March, CNN (Dec. 8,
2014, 8:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/23/us/new-york-choke-hold-rally/inde
x.html.
332. Dana Ford, South Carolina Ex-police Officer Indicted in Walter Scott Killing, CNN
(June 8, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/south-carolina-slager-indi
ctment-walter-scott.
333. Jessica King & AnneClaire Stapleton, CharlottePoliceKill Ex-FAMU Player Who May
Have Been Running to Them for Help, CNN (Sept. 16, 2013, 8:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com
/2013/09/15/justice/north-carolina-police-shooting/index.html.
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legislation of the 1960s 3 34 and the Reconstruction Amendments of
the 1860s 3 3 -placed all races of Americans on equal footing; and

that this "equality" could now be maintained by ensuring that
everyone is held to the same standards going forward. It is the
elevation of process over substance, of means over ends, and of a
mechanical rather that transformative vision of justice. It is also a
misunderstanding of the nature of racial inequality and its effects
in the modern world, which is more consistently and perniciously
characterized by the discriminatory impacts of facially neutral
policies not on individuals, but on communities of color. Most
troubling, however, is that this limited construction resurrects a
failed vision of civil rights law whereby the Constitution only
prohibits discrimination, rather than affirmatively guaranteeing
that people of color the full measure of equal inclusion in our
society.336 Chief Justice Roberts provided an eerie reminder of
Justice Bradley's "special favorite of the laws" when he
perfunctorily explained that "the way to stop discriminating based
on race is to stop discriminating based on race." 3 7
The desire to ultimately eliminate racial considerations
from government policy making may be a laudable one, but it will
require that we first actually address both the continuing impacts
of our legacy of legal discrimination, and the entrenchment and
compounding of those impacts through otherwise facially neutral
policies and practices. The legal system is not there yet. As my
colleague Ted Shaw often points out, African Americans have
been enslaved or segregated by law for all but the last fifty of the
400 years they have been in America. The law still has a long way
to go before we potentially get to that vision of a "post-racial"
society. A new Civil Rights Act, designed to meaningfully address
the racially disparate outcomes that define race discrimination
today and to ensure the full measure of inclusion of
membership-and the privileges and immunities of our societyfor people of color, is the necessary next step.

334.
(2012).
335.
336.
(2007).
337.

See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§

2000d et seq.

See U.S. CONsT. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
See Parents Involved in Cinty. Sch. v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743-44
Id. at 748.

